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5

Several Senses of Being Starting from Metaphysics $\Delta 7$

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Varia

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Non-conceptual pattern, manner or procedure?

Abstract: One source of misunderstanding about modeling non-conceptual mental content in Kant's philosophy of mind and perception consists in the conventional functionalist reading that the apprehension of the power of imagination, both in the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, stands as the relevant cognitive apparatus for creating a mental content without any concepts. I clarify that 'sensible intuitions' and 'reflective intuitions' in the *first* and *third* Critiques signify two distinct stages of the phenomenal consciousness and cannot be justified by the same 'procedure' of mind. Sensible intuitions of different types are world-directed if they are justified by the 'way and manner' of perceiving objects through the representation of space as the relevant cognitive pattern, although they can appear with phenomenological different patterns given by nature or the mind itself. Reflective intuitions are, by contrast, non-world-directed but only satisfy the state of mind. Respectively, I conclude that Kant establishes a stronger phenomenal conservatism than his contemporary commentators have argued for because the relevant cognitive pattern is independent of the emergence of objects.

Keywords: Content of Cognition, Power of Imagination, Cognitive Pattern, Representation of Space, Explanatory Value, Phenomenal Conservatism

1. Kant, Phenomenal Consciousness and Non-Conceptual Content Revisited

Kant's theory of experience refers to a 'stage of the empirical' knowledge and phenomenal consciousness (OP, 21: 90),¹ according to which

¹ All references to Kant's works are from *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (1992ff.). KrV = *Critique of Pure Reason* (2009), followed by A/B reference; KpV = *Critique of Practical Reason* (2015); KU = *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (2002); EEKU = *First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgement* (2002); Anth = *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (2007); Prol = *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics* (2002); MAN = *Metaphysical foundations of natural science* (2002); ÜE = *On a discovery*

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representations can be referring, i.e., world-directed if they are justified not only by pure concepts of understanding (categories), but also by pure forms of intuitions (space and time) in order to be ‘antecedently well-founded information’ (KrV, A60/B85) and be accorded with a cognitive pattern. Kant calls this kind of phenomenal consciousness ‘doctrinal experience (*experientia doctorinalis*)’ because its representational content, i.e., singular representation (sensible intuition) entails as well the principles of such perceptual experience.² The data, properties and conjectures given by or derived from other stages of the empirical knowledge including ‘perception (*animadversio*), observation (*observatio*), [and] experiment’, as Kant classifies, are of less significance for evaluating the world-directedness of representations, because they provide either only a raw or anticipatory pattern for experience itself (perception) or disparate properties with no initial pattern at all (observation and experiment).³ They relate thus to no objects of the outer world but only to the state of mind of the human subject and can be evaluated as

whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by an older one (2002); FM = What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff? (2002); VT = On a recently prominent tone of superiority in philosophy (2002); DfS = The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures (1992); NG = Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1992); GUGR = Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space (1992); MSI = On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (1992); MS = The Metaphysics of Morals (1996); Log = Jäsche Logic (1992); V-Lo/Blomberg = Lectures on Logic (1992); V-Met/Mron, V-Met/Arnoldt = Lectures on Metaphysics (1997); V-Anth/Fried = Lectures on Anthropology (2012); ÜGTP = On the use of teleological principles in philosophy (2007); Br = Correspondence (1999); OP = Opus Postumum (1993); and to *Gesammelte Werke* (1900ff., Bd. XIVff.). HN = *Handschriftlicher Nachlass*; followed by the volume and page number.

² Cf. KrV, A56/B80, A59/B83ff., A72/B97, A77/B102; Prol, 4: 266; FM, 20: 337, where ‘content of cognition’ is tantamount to ‘sensible intuitions’ and ‘singular representations’.

³ Cf. KrV, B160, B218, A183/B226, FM, 20: 274-5, ÜE, 8: 217, that ‘perception’ is the ‘empirical consciousness’ of appearances and can be transformed into ‘experience’ if justified by pure forms of sensibility and understanding.

unstructured stuff of mind. Consequently, only sensible intuitions stand as the relevant candidate to raise the question whether representations could refer to the objects of the outer world without concepts.⁴ Notably, Kant holds that particular objects of the outer world cannot be represented by concepts without the role of sensible intuitions because concepts are ‘universal’ by nature and ‘common’ to different objects (Log, 9: 91), and the series of their determination can never be completed without disregarding the ‘specific differences’ contained in those particular objects (Log, 9: 97). Consequently, ‘no lowest concept (*conceptus infimus*)’ can be found that directly relate to particular objects. As we will see in the next section in more details (2.), this genuine doctrine is the main line of argument that Kant raises against both unstructured, sheer receptivity of our sensibility instituted by empiricist school of thought and inefficiency of general constraints of mind instituted by rationalist school of thought, on the one hand, and against contemporary, conceptualist readings, for instance of Ginsborg (2013) and McDowell (1994), who reject the autonomy of sensible intuitions, even in some weak sense.

In non-conceptualism camp which constitutes the main interest of this article, one source of misunderstanding about coupling Kantian ‘content of cognition’ with non-conceptual mental content in the contemporary philosophy of mind and perception consists in the

⁴ Different variations of non-conceptual mental content can be found in Gunther (2003), Speaks (2005), Schmidt (2015) and Hanna (2011). As I read it, the problem is whether *there are* representations that could be referring without concepts (as to their ‘autonomous’ constitutions) or whether *representations* could be referring without concepts (as to their ‘incompatibility’ with concepts) according to one and the same *logical* structure and in one and the same cognition. Arguments for and against non-conceptual content emerge either positively from properties contained in identified instances, or negatively from the inefficiency of conceptual constraints of mind for explaining those instances. In any case, a positive explanatory value for explaining the ‘way’, how identified instances are constituted, is required.

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conviction that the *same* power of imagination in the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* and in *Critique of the Power of Judgement* stands as the relevant cognitive apparatus for creating a (cognitive) pattern by apprehending the manifold contained in sensible intuitions without the role of pure concepts of understanding,⁵ and by forming and maintaining the representation of the beautiful without concepts, in one way or another.⁶ Hanna's (2020, 2011: 334) and Rohs' (2001) functionalist readings about the 'lower level' intuitive 'spontaneity' of the power of imagination are of such kind.⁷ Neither of the advocates of the latter conviction has clarified, however, why judgments of cognition and taste should have two different objects, namely 'sensible intuitions' and 'reflective intuitions' if the manifold of the perceptual experience is combined by the same power.

Kant himself holds that the power of imagination *per se* contains certain 'procedures' of the mind capable of providing only a 'new direction' (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 514f.) by joining the manifold in a given representation in the *background* of an already existing pattern of

⁵ Cf. Hanna (2011, 2022), Allais (2009), Rohs (2001).

⁶ Cf. Aquila (1979), Heidemann (2019), Ginsborg (2015), Allison (2001). In *Synthesis and Binding*, Allais revised her standpoint in that synthesis is a 'conceptually-governed' operation of mind and 'comes at a higher level' (2017: 27-29).

⁷ According to functionalism, 'what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part' (Levin 2023) and entails in some sense a claim about 'physical realizations of these mental functions' (Schlicht & Newen, 2015: 88). Both Rohs and Hanna argue from the Fregean standpoint and consider only the first premise, so that both 'non-sensible senses' (Rohs 2001: 222) and 'rogue objects' yielded by the 'intuitive spontaneity' of the power of imagination amount to abstract, strongly non-existing objects. Also, Schellenberg argues that the standard reading of Kant's *first Critique* is 'to analyze mental states in terms of the capacities by means of which they were brought about' (2019: 117) and Brook argues that 'we can recognize intuitions only after acts of synthesis, not as they come to us' (1994: 125). Functionalist readings can also be found in the conceptualist reading of De Bruijn's (2022).

sensible intuitions, (in the A-Deduction of the *first Critique*) with or (in the B-Deduction of the *first Critique*) without concepts, and of forming a presumptive natural pattern for tasteful representations derived from ‘observation’ (in the *third Critique*), without at the same time being capable of justifying the ‘way and manner’ of perceiving objects, namely whether the apprehended representations contain a perceptual world-directed ‘pattern’.⁸ The Imagination is, therefore, a power of mind that yields *by itself* no content whatsoever, and its procedures would be a mere play if not restricted to some pattern that signifies a kind of phenomenal consciousness.⁹

The aim of this article is to differentiate among three representational aspects of sensible intuitions, namely their (1) phenomenological different ‘patterns’ given by nature or the mind itself, (2) spatially justified ‘way and manner’ of perceiving them and (3) the relevant mental ‘procedures’ of mind for exposing them, and to argue that Kant establishes a stronger phenomenal conservatism with regard to the structure, namely spatiality of sensible intuitions than his contemporary non-conceptualist and conceptualist commentators have argued for in that sensible intuitions contain a non-conceptual cognitive pattern *a priori*, namely three-dimensionality of the representation of space, standing as a world-directed conscious hyphen between concepts of understanding and objects of the outer world. To this effect, world-directedness of representations, namely representing something ‘*outside us*, signifies only existence (*Existenz*) in space’ (Prol, 4:337) or ‘the existence (*Dasein*) of objects in space outside me’ (KrV, B275). Furthermore, given the spatial structure *a priori* of sensible intuitions,

⁸ The same diagnosis can also be found in Dunlop who prefers ‘primitive representation of objects’ in the sense of a pattern given by nature and in contrast to ‘conceptual representation’ of sensible intuitions, on the one hand, and to ‘raw and brute input’ of sensations, on the other hand (2017: 47f., 65).

⁹ Cf. KrV, A239/B298, that concepts would be ‘a mere play’ of imagination or understanding if not restricted to sensible intuitions.

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Kant can be considered as a phenomenal conservative with regard to objects of the outer world, for phenomenal conservatism is an internalist theory of epistemic justification that holds that ‘the way things *seem* or *appear* to be is a source of justification for believing that things are actually so’ (Moretti 2015). Neither in his pre-critical nor in his critical writings does Kant raise any doubt about the significance of objects of the outer world. The novelty of transcendental idealism consists, by contrast, in providing an explanatory value for those objects, namely for appearances. In what follows, I am going to argue for two claims:

(1) Kant argues in favor of non-conceptuality of sensible intuitions of different causal histories and of different phenomenological patterns given by nature or the mind itself because he provides an elastic, unilateral explanatory value for sensible intuitions of *any* (empirical, semi-empirical and pure) types by establishing the ‘representation of space’ as a cognitive pattern that provides the ‘way and manner’ of justification standing in the background of the ‘procedure(s)’ of the power of imagination.¹⁰ World-directedness of representations can only be justified by this ‘way and manner’, which is indeed non-conceptual, and not by sub-structural patterns of appearances themselves or by some ‘procedures’ of mind in terms of a set of ‘method[s] for representing a multitude’ (KrV, A140/B179). Transcendental idealism creates, therefore, no double standard about the content of cognition by discriminating among sensible intuitions of different types or by incorporating reflective intuitions into the latter types. As Kant makes no distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access

¹⁰ Except Hanna, almost any mainstream reading about the nature of Kant’s ‘content of cognition’ in both non-conceptualist and conceptualist camps agrees that the relevant class of sensible intuitions should refer only to empirical ones. Cf. McLearn (2016a, 2016b), Allais (2009, 2015, 2017), Tolley (2022) in the non-conceptualist camp, but also Ginsborg (2013), Allison (1983/2004) and McDowell (1994) in the conceptualist camp. For naturalistic tendencies in the latter readings, cf. Zammito (2008).

consciousness,¹¹ this cognitive pattern is valid both propositionally and non-propositionally.

(2) His argument directs at the possibility, i.e., the soundness of the structure of sensible intuitions of any types as extended mental entities,¹² namely as *spatial* representations, not at the actuality and, consequently, not at the correctness or accuracy conditions of sensible intuitions, and creates, therefore, no implications as to the metaphysics of properties or of capacities of mind.¹³ The representation of the beautiful is, by contrast, no mental entity but an appearance emerging to the 'self' because it rests on the fulfillment conditions of the capacities of mind. To this effect, I advocate a representationalism and argue against functionalism including Hanna's naïve realism and against phenomenalism including Allais's relationalism, McLearn's enactivism and Tolley's semantic phenomenalism, who, in one way or another, argue in favor of metaphysical determinacy of the referents of singular

¹¹ Phenomenal consciousness is 'experience' and access consciousness is the availability of information 'for use' as 'a premise to reasoning' (Ned Block 1995). On this issue, I agree with both Indregard (2018) and Longuenesse (2023) that Kant makes no distinction between phenomenal consciousness (sensible intuitions) and access consciousness (active role of the capacity of sensibility in virtue of conscious representations). However, I do not agree with them that phenomenal consciousness should include representations of the inner sense in the broad sense, including all sensory information in the sense of state consciousness. It is not only for the reason that sensible intuitions are 'objective perceptions' (KrV, B376f.), but also for the reason that sensible intuitions in some cases are propositional cognitions (cf. Prol, 4: 281, §7).

¹² Cf. Brook that sensible intuitions are 'theoretical entities' and no sense-data (1994: 125). However, I do not agree with him that sensible intuitions are 'unprocessed' without synthesis in the first place (1994: 276, note 15).

¹³ Cf. Log, 9: 36, that the distinction between 'intuitions' and 'concepts' is a 'logical', and the distinction between 'receptivity' and 'spontaneity' or 'the lower faculty' and 'the higher faculty' is a 'metaphysical' mode of explanation.

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representations.¹⁴ My phenomenal conservatism is yet compatible with the ‘qualified phenomenalism’ that ‘allows that there may be aspects or properties of objects that they possess independently of how we represent them’ (Stang 2023), and is also compatible with Falkenstein’s ‘non-sensationist intuitionism’, that ‘a certain output of the cognitive system is already given in an input that is not a sensation’ (1995: 9).

2. Sensible Intuitions and Cognitive Pattern

Kant’s primary objective for reconciling the cluster of concepts ‘content of cognition’, ‘singular representations’ and ‘sensible intuitions’ pertains to the inefficiency of general constraints of mind instituted by both empiricist and rationalist schools of thought for representing the primitive mind-independent matters of fact through the truth of reason associated typically with logical principles of identity and contradiction and ontological principle of sufficient reason.¹⁵ Without neglecting the status and significance of materially existing objects, the transcendental idealism argues that the ‘general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided’ by general constraints of mind because ‘facts’ are ‘objects for concepts’ if they are already structured and well-founded, namely if objects correspond to sensible ‘intuitions’ (KU, 5: 468). In other words, if matters of fact are ‘material (objective) truth of the cognition’ and ‘truth concerns precisely this content’ (KrV, A59/B83f.), then their

¹⁴ Cf. Pereira (2021) for various versions of phenomenalism, both in historical context and in contemporary Kant scholarship. Cf. Allais that perceiving appearances stands in a relation to ‘its affecting objects’ (2009: 413; 2015: 207ff), McLearn that ‘perceptual consciousness’ is partially constituted by ‘acquainting a subject with her environment’ (2016a; 2016b: 195) and Tolley that we can only refer to representations as ‘mind-dependent objects’ in the Fregean ‘de re’ sense, nevertheless they depend on something real = x (2022).

¹⁵ Cf. Beck (1978: 80–100), for a full review of these distinctions between matters of fact and truth of reason.

representational objects themselves should be an ‘antecedently well-founded information’ (KrV, A60/B85) and be borne on certain self-contained *truth condition(s)*, not merely compounded of sheer receptivity of sensations without an initial justification. Kant represents the latter standpoint not only from the worst-case scenario that ‘appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity’ (KrV, B123), but indeed from the fact that we are initially in possession of certain positive cognitions, including geometrical figures and indiscernibles as showpieces of singular representations that can be represented with ‘clarity’, i.e., ‘consciousness of one’s representations that suffices for the distinction of one object from another’ non-inferentially (Anth, 7: 138, §6).¹⁶

Representing, for instance, *this* or *that* carnival mask is tantamount to saying that this type of object has certain set of features coordinated by its partial representations that is not ‘common’ to other objects and so discriminates it from other objects with other sets of features.¹⁷ As a ‘kind’, such a representation is not restricted to the tokens of its type (containing probably also extra properties) but is a self-contained representation bearing a structure-preserving mapping between the tokens of the same type, i.e. an isomorphy.¹⁸ This isomorphy applies not only to tokens of sensible intuitions of one peculiar type, but, as we will

¹⁶ Kant continues to state that ‘but that consciousness by means of which the composition of representations also becomes clear is called distinctness’ and is satisfied by concepts.

¹⁷ Cf. also KrV, A32/B47; Logic, 9: 91, that concepts relate to objects through features ‘common’ to many objects.

¹⁸ Falkenstein (1995: 11, 110, 136, 247) and Onof & Schulting (2015: 36 and note) prefer the ‘topology’ over ‘isomorphy’ for explaining the spatial structure of intuitions. As I will clarify, the spatial structure can be separated from the patterns of objects. Then, the structurality itself does not entail (and contain) the actuality and existence (or the data of) representations, but not vice versa.

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see, also to sensible intuitions of any type as spatial representations.¹⁹ It entails as well that a singular representation is not produced by reflection or some other activity of mind but rests upon the disposition of our sensibility governed by the spatiality,²⁰ and relates thereby ‘directly to’ objects (KrV, A320/B377).²¹ To this extent, sensible intuitions are at least in some weak sense object-dependent because representing an object merely through common features would not represent an extended object.²²

Kant registers four types of sensible intuitions with different phenomenological sub-structural ‘patterns’ (*Muster*) as to their causal history,²³ and distinguishes them *altogether* from other non-world-directed representations. Sensible intuitions are (i) empirical, ordinary and abundant if they supervene upon sensations, conditioned by the fact that the latter sensory data are arbitrary (*zufällig*). The representational object of empirical sensible intuitions is undetermined, and its

¹⁹ Since the spatial structure itself does not contain the data of appearances, it cannot be bijective, i.e., a 1-1 onto mapping.

²⁰ Cf. A22/B37, that ‘sensibility’ is the ‘property of our mind’. Cf. also Anth, 7:141, that ‘sensibility’ is itself a ‘fundamental capacity’ (*Grundvermögen*) of representation and cannot be reduced to other capacities of mind. The same line of thought can also be found in Crusius who considers the ‘sensibility’ as a power of representation distinct from ‘the active fundamental power’ of mind (1747: §86), which is, in contrast to Kant’s position, in contact with the ‘actual existence’ of objects (1747: §64, §434). Both Kant and Crusius criticize thereby Wolff’s single and active, fundamental power of representation (*vis representativa*) (cf. Wolff 1972: §547; 1983: §§600, 765) for perceiving objects and as a higher-order theory of consciousness.

²¹ Cf. Anth, 7: 141, note, that the sensibility is not restricted to bodily sense organs.

²² Cf. Ginsborg (2013) and McDowell (1994) who reject the autonomy of intuitions even in some weak sense. For example, Ginsborg argues that ‘to speak of sensibility in isolation from understanding is to speak counterfactually’ (2013: 218).

²³ Kant speaks of ‘pattern’ not only of the constitution of objects, but also of ideas and concepts (cf. KrV, B161; Anth, 7: 173, 224; KU, 5: 232f.), which are, however, non-world-directed by themselves.

counterpart could be true.²⁴ By contrast, sensible intuitions are (ii) pure but finite if the representational object is 'generated in the mind completely *a priori*' by pure, i.e., schematic construction of mind (KrV, A240/B299). While empirical intuitions contain a raw pattern given by nature, the emergence of a geometrical figure does not 'borrow a *pattern* for it from any experience' (KrV, A713/B741, emphasis added), even though it is 'an *appearance* present to the senses' (KrV, A240/B299, emphasis added). The representation of a dog, for instance, as a <four-footed, mammal, of excellent sense of smell> animal is an empirical intuition because it might contain other properties than those mentioned above, whereas the representation of a triangle is a pure intuition because it can emerge, be generated and be synthesized without any (sensory) data.²⁵ In addition, a geometrical figure can apply to the actual and existing objects of the world through the technical construction, by carrying out on some kind of 'material' (ÜE, 8: 192, note), via the voluntary action of the will, without its 'content' being thereby affected (EEKU, 20: 198; KpV, 5: 31). Another difference is that the represented objects of pure geometrical figures are also valid propositionally, 'are always intuitive' and have 'apodictic' certainty (Prol, 4: 281, §7).²⁶

Furthermore, sensible intuitions are (iii) semi-empirical if a body contains counterparts that are (conceptually) exactly equal in magnitude and similar in quality to one another, but contain 'a difference in outer relation' (Prol, 4: 285-6).²⁷ Indiscernibles, i.e., incongruent counterparts and snails are among such instances.²⁸ The pattern of semi-empirical intuitions can be borrowed from nature or be generated by thought

²⁴ Cf. Prol, 4: 281.

²⁵ Cf. KpV, 5: 31; EEKU, 20: 230, note; KU, 5: 177-8.

²⁶ Cf. also Prol, 4: 283, 287.

²⁷ Cf. GUGR, 2: 382; NG, 2: 171, 180, 202; Dfs, 2: 61-60.

²⁸ Cf. MAN, 4: 483f.

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experiment,²⁹ but it is the orientation and the ‘opposed directions’ that constitute such objects (KrV, A282/B338), which is a mental ‘action of the creative cause producing the counterpart’ (GUGR, 2: 382).

Despite all differences in patterns, all latter types can be represented according to the ‘way and manner (*die Art und Weise; die Art, wie*)’ of positing their partial representations next to each other provided by the (three-dimensional) representation of space as the relevant cognitive pattern. Since all objects of the senses contain a composite, representing those objects contains certain relations among their parts, and these relations cannot be reduced to those and other objects themselves in an empirical regress as their relevant condition.³⁰ Consequently, we cannot perceive the boundaries of the world by perceiving appearances themselves. But since we are actually able to represent the objects (of the outer world), the whole of these relations themselves and its relevant cognitive ability precede, as Kant argues, the representations of objects as a condition of mind and ‘as an all-encompassing *receptacle* containing nothing except places of things’ in mind (V-Met/Mron, 29: 830; emphasis added), which makes our initial contact with appearances of the world and relating our representations to ‘something external’ possible (KrV, A28/B44).³¹ Unlike his predecessors, neither does Kant restrict the representation of particular objects to a number of one-off cases identified against the general constraints of mind,³² nor does he reject that an initial object of the senses could be unstructured and of no

²⁹ Cf. GUGR, 2: 382.

³⁰ Cf. KrV, A519-522/B547-550.

³¹ Cf. A23/B38, I. For the notion of ‘way and manner’, cf. also KrV, A44/B61, B67-68, B306; V-Met/Arnoldt, 29: 974ff.

³² As Kant himself points out (ÜE, 8: 245-246), Locke’s, Reusch’s and Crusius’ identifications of knowledge of coexistence and of relations, synthetic clarity, and metaphysical propositions, including hypothetical knowledge, provide at the same time no specific explanatory value for them.

significance for cognition,³³ or that the physical distinction would necessarily entail consciousness of objects.³⁴ Transcendental, i.e., formal idealism leaves open whether the outer objects of sensible intuitions actually exist.³⁵ It advocates, by contrast, the thesis that any particular object can be the object of cognition if it is justified by the ‘way and manner’ of perceiving them irrespective of the mode of its emergence.³⁶

Thereupon, Kant concludes that the pure representation *a priori* of (iv) space is itself a type of sensible intuition if we can represent the extension, i.e., ‘mere relations, of places in one intuition’ and display it as an ‘image’ and as a ‘formal intuition’ that is ‘the essential property of our sensibility’ (Prol, 4: 287). As Kant emphasizes, the representation of space is an ‘essentially single’ representation (KrV, A25/B39), and the ‘first datum’ of mind *a priori* (KpV, 5: 42),³⁷ because we are able to represent the ‘way and manner’ of juxtapositioning even without ‘an actual object of the senses or sensation in the mind’ (KrV, A21/B35). Yet and most importantly, Kant adds that this ‘way and manner’ emerges ‘without spontaneity’ (KrV, 67–69, 157, note), either of the power of imagination or of the understanding.³⁸ He concludes that it is a self-contained and self-standing mental entity, namely an ‘individual representation’ (KrV, B136,

³³ This includes any acquaintances given to one’s mind even ‘through immediate experience’ and corresponds to what Kant calls ‘historical cognition (*cognitio ex datis*)’, which is an unstructured cognition, in contrast to ‘rational cognition (*cognitio ex principiis*)’, which is a structured cognition (KrV, A836/B864). For different degrees of cognition weaker than rational cognition, cf. Log, 9: 64–65.

³⁴ Cf. DfS 2: 59 and KU, 5: 464, that physical differentiation by non-human animals does not entail that they ‘see’ and ‘act’ according to representations.

³⁵ Cf. KrV, B274f. (Refutation of Idealism), A491/B519f., Prol, 4: 337.

³⁶ Cf. Prol, 4: 337, that ‘outside us, signifies only existence in space’. Cf. also KrV, A23/B38.

³⁷ Cf. also HN, 17: 615.

³⁸ Even though an ‘object of the sense’ contains ‘a composite’ (ÜE, 8: 2019–210, note), all combination is ‘an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation’, i.e., of the understanding (KrV, B130, §15).

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note), that provides an explanatory value for sensible intuitions of any types.³⁹ And to distinguish the pure representation of space as ‘a given infinite magnitude’ (KrV, A25/B41) from finite, pure geometrical figures, he indicates that:

Space is something so *uniform*, and so indeterminate with respect to *all specific properties*, that certainly no one will look for a stock of natural laws within it. By contrast, that which determines space into the figure of a circle, a cone, or a sphere is the understanding, insofar as it contains the basis for the unity of the construction of these figures. The *mere universal form of intuition called space* is therefore certainly the *substratum* of all intuitions determinable upon *particular objects*, and, admittedly, the condition for the possibility and *variety of those intuitions* lies in this space; but the unity of the objects is determined solely through the understanding (Prol, 4:321-2; emphasis added).⁴⁰

Kant does not design a theory for objects proper. He does not reject their existence, either. He only dedicates his theory of experience to the bounds of content of cognition independent of empirical consciousness, i.e., to the well-grounded manner of perceiving the appearances outside the experience itself that enables our contact with objects whatsoever. In Kant’s account, the ‘way and manner’ that provides an explanatory value for perceiving objects is the form of those objects. This form is, however, not phenomenal in the sense of the mode of emergence of objects, but mental in the sense of their justification, ‘so far as’ it is in

³⁹ For an extensive review of the problem about KrV, B160-61 and its relevant note, cf. Onof & Schulting (2015).

⁴⁰ The role of understanding here and in regulation of judgments of taste (cf. footnote 54 and the relevant text) does not entail the application of concepts, but is a ‘metacognitive’ function, a kind of ‘desire for unity’ that ‘goes beyond whatever is necessary for ordinary cognition’ (Guyer, 2006: 182-3). Another difference between geometrical figures and the representation of space is that the first can apply to actual objects of the world (cf. ÜE, 8: 192, note), whereas the second cannot.

mind and can 'be known by reason' (VT, 8: 404) and can behave towards different patterns elastically. To this effect, what in this article I take to be the 'cognitive pattern' refers to 'the way and manner' of perceiving objects for justifying the possibility of those objects, without neglecting at the same the very 'data of appearances'.⁴¹

Therefore, where Kant takes the 'content of cognition' into consideration, he refers to 'the represented object with the *properties* that *sensible intuition* attributes to it' (KrV, A44/B62; emphasis added), irrespective of whether this content is empirical and irrespective of its mode of emergence. Merely being conscious of some representation will not certify it as the content of cognition, but if the representation is constituted spatially, i.e., mapped with spatial properties that can parallel the appearances elastically.

Just to be clear about the 'data of appearances', Kant differentiates the 'content of cognition' from a set of unstructured representations. He excludes, in the first place, sensations (sensory content) from representational objects because they are, albeit conscious, non-referring and 'has only the 2nd position' for cognitions (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 44). He also demarcates the stuff (*Stoff*) of the mind from the content of cognition. Stuff of mind partly refers to representations capable of being ordered and justified by pure forms of cognition and be certified as the 'proper material' for cognition (KrV, BXXXIX), but partly to the 'unsought extensive undeveloped' material brought about by the activity of the power of imagination (KU, 5:317). In the second sense, stuff of mind is a 'raw material' typically of sensations and impressions (KrV, A1, B1), and since it is of a *posteriori* status, it can be imbricated with what Kant calls 'data' of mind as 'something conditioned' and of 'a posteriori' status in mind (KrV, A512/B540), in so far as it amounts to representations grasped from experiences through sense organs and stand outside the space of

⁴¹ I prefer the 'cognitive pattern' over the 'cognitive map' because the latter is associated with and is relative to context-dependency and the empirical, spatial environment.

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(formal) justification.⁴² Finally, he also excludes the ‘real content’ (*wirklicher Inhalt*) or ‘contents’ (*Gehalt*) of representations that relates to their ‘physical’ status and ‘intensity’ in space and time (KrV, A723/B751), which can be measured and estimated as an amount.

3. Sensible Intuitions, Reflective Intuitions and Imagination

Obviously, the most significant kind of representation to be distinguished from sensible intuitions is ‘reflective intuitions’ (Anth, 7: 239, B.), or, as Kant mentions this in the *third Critique*, ‘reflected perception’ (KU, 5:191).⁴³ Reflective intuitions are the object of judgments of taste and the result of joining the manifold contained in a given representation together through the power of imagination ‘in a mere contemplation’ (KU, 5: 209, 204), i.e., without considering the causal history of the manifold, the arrangement and constitution of its partial representation, and the availability of some concept of the object as the cause of its emergence, namely ‘without a sensation of the senses or a concept’ (KU, 5: 280–81). Such an intuition can eventually be expected to be felt with pleasure if the free play of imagination comes into harmony with the faculty of understanding without applying its concepts, namely if the

⁴² An unanimous referee suggests that such treatment of ‘stuff of mind’ is puzzling and should be elaborated in more details because it is *highly relevant to the discussion of non-conceptual content in perception* and in *discussing the expression of aesthetic ideas by the genius*. It is yet a *contradicto in adjecto* because ‘stuff of mind’ signifies unstructured materials by nature and definition. I will return to this point in the coming paragraphs.

⁴³ Thanks to an unanimous referee who acknowledges that Kant deploys ‘reflected perception’ (KU, 5: 191) as a suggestive term in the *third Critique* for ‘reflective intuitions’ (Anth, 7: 239, B.) in *Anthropology*, and that the latter term appears only once in *Anthropology*, which is, however, also applicable to the ‘reflected perception’ itself. For the sake of comparison with ‘sensible intuitions’, I prefer yet ‘reflective intuitions’ over ‘reflected perception’ to emphasize, as Kant holds it and we will see in the following lines, that even one and the same empirical intuition can be the representational object of both sensible and reflective intuitions, namely of objects of the outer world and taste.

animation of the latter cognitive faculties is conducted in ‘the mere form of purposiveness in the representation’ of an object by the reflective power of judgment (KU, 5: 221, §11, emphasis added; cf. KU, 5: 220, §11; 5: 192). Being so, the representation of the beautiful is a ‘positive’ and self-standing ‘phenomenon’ and a ‘preserving’ state of mind (KU, 5: 269; KU, 5: 170; EEKU, 20: 231), and its emergence is the effect of actualization of certain *fulfillment conditions*, i.e., the ‘disposition of the cognitive faculties’ (KU, 5: 238-9). Even though the initial representational object to be felt with pleasure is an empirical intuition (cf. EEKU, 20: 224, 228, 289), and to this extent might overlap with the representational object of sensible intuitions, Kant emphasizes that it is the phenomenal ‘form of surfaces [*Oberfläche*’] (KU, 5: 375) and the ‘shape [*Gestalt*’] of objects (KU, 5: 230) that can be formed and maintained as a tasteful representation and surpasses to this extent both the spatial cognitive pattern and natural pattern of sensible intuitions.⁴⁴

For instance, by expressing that <Rembrandt’s *Storm on Sea of Galilee* is beautiful> I am not apprehending the sensory properties such as <of oil-on-canvas, dark clouds moving, disciples terrifyingly responding> contained in the representational object <Rembrandt’s *Storm on Sea of Galilee*> in the background of its initial pattern given in the empirical intuition and do not relate them, consequently, to the

⁴⁴ Cf. Zuckert (2006), Zinkin (2006), Guyer (1997), Aquila (1979)), Carroll (2014) and Allison (2001), who in one way or another equate the properties of the initial representation of an object to be perceived as beautiful with the spatial or spatial-temporal manifold contained in empirical intuitions. By contrast, Kant considers that the representational object in judgments of taste amounts only to the ‘mere form’ of purposiveness in the representation, i.e., without the availability of any concept as a cause (KU, 5: 221f., 228f.). To this point, I agree with Lehman that the ‘mere form’ is an alternative to (natural) ‘phenomenal form’ (2017: 249), conditioned by the fact that the latter notion is understood in the sense of ‘sensible phenomenal form’ because, as I will argue, ‘reflective intuitions’ have also a ‘phenomenal form’, albeit non-sensible. Cf. also Guyer that such a representation has an ‘internally opaque content’ (1997: 105).

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constitution of that object standing in front of me.⁴⁵ Instead, I am evaluating that (1) the representational object has or might have some properties that can be discovered by observation and that (2) I try to pair those properties together by the power of imagination to become conscious of an object as beautiful, namely to feel it with pleasure. As a result, <Rembrandt's *Storm on Sea of Galilee* is beautiful> means that <Rembrandt's *Storm on Sea of Galilee*, which contents me with myself, is beautiful> where the 'feeling of pleasure' assigns the 'content' of this judgment (KU, 5: 281).⁴⁶ Kant emphasize that such a judgment is an 'evaluation' (*Beurteilung*), i.e., a judgment according to 'self-satisfaction and charm' (HN, 15: 461; my translation), and no proposition, i.e. a primary bearer of truth-value dependent on *truth conditions* of sensibility and understanding, and directs only at 'ideality of purposiveness', namely 'does not allow us to use any realism of an end in it as an explanatory ground for our power of representation' according to 'empirical principles', of e.g. laws of the affinity of materials (KU, 5: 349-50, §58), and 'can be perceived only internally' as an *preserving* state of mind (KU, 5: 289, §37). Since the formation and maintenance of the representation of the beautiful neither emerges according to concepts nor is an arbitrary phenomenon, it raises, however, the question of whether reflective intuitions could be competent to count as non-conceptual content and be a competitor for sensible intuitions.⁴⁷

Beside the *cognitivist* aspect of judgments of taste that affects the manner of perceiving objects with pleasure and relates to the underlying endeavor of cognitive faculties, the other, and in fact, hitherto confusing, if not neglected, side of Kant's theory of taste concerns the *formalism*

⁴⁵ Cf. KU, 5: 204, 209.

⁴⁶ The feeling of pleasure is only an 'ability' (*Fähigkeit*) of mind (MS, 6: 211), and no representation to be exposed by a cognitive pattern.

⁴⁷ Cf. Aquila (1979), Allison (2001), Ginsborg (2015) and Heidemann (2019), who argue that it is a non-conceptual mental content.

about the status and structure of the representational object that can be felt with pleasure. The initial representational object to be felt with pleasure is not ‘stuff’ of mind in the sense of a cluster of mere imaginations. It is yet a representation given in an empirical intuition and yields thus ‘a ground outside ourselves’ (KU, 5: 246) as a ‘limitation’ (KU, 5: 244). And the kind of phenomenal consciousness Kant attributes to perceiving the initial representational object of judgments of taste is called ‘observation’.

‘Observation’ is a kind of perceptual experience, a stage of the empirical knowledge and description of nature conducted ‘methodologically’ (ÜGTP, 8: 161), and serves to ‘discover the properties of objects of outer sense’ (Br, 11: 143),⁴⁸ and so a kind of active, procedural knowledge conducted by an endeavor of the mind. To this extent, properties derived from observations are other than those already perceived and given in ordinary intuitions, even though they might have one and the same empirical intuition.⁴⁹ Observing does not justify the constitution of the representational object as to the ‘way and manner’ of its perceiving via spatial cognitive pattern, but serves to discover the properties governing ‘phenomena and their laws in general’ (Br, 10: 145). Since the properties derived from observations are disparate and without any primitive pattern given by nature, the relevant representational object contains neither a phenomenal form at the outset nor does ‘possess any necessity’ via a mental form or cognitive pattern (MSI, 2: 404), so that we cannot lay any claim about possession of an object in the first place. The properties acquainted by observations are, therefore, neither isomorphically nor causally ‘designated’ (KU, 5:

⁴⁸ Cf. Ginsborg (2015: 139, 163, 186) and Allison (2001: 151), who take the ‘observation’ in the ordinary, not technical sense.

⁴⁹ In contrast to ‘observation’, ‘experiment’ is as an endeavor to seek elements and conjectures for a theory or hypothesis to be ‘confirmed or refuted’ (KrV, XVIII, note.). Cf. Daston (2013: 663) for a more clarification.

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204). But it is the 'data' contained in empirical intuitions that stand in the foreground of investigation and could result in a peculiar kind of phenomenal form in a discriminatory manner.⁵⁰

Now Kant argues that some variation of the combination of these disparate and non-isomorphic perceptual properties could lay out a phenomenal form of an object to be felt with pleasure by the free and productive power of imagination through its invention.⁵¹ Imagination is a power (*Kraft*) of mind for actualization of representations and their relevant capacities (*Vermögen*),⁵² 'even without [the] presence' of an object in intuition (KrV, B151). It produces only a 'new direction' (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 514f.) by joining a manifold together and is thus capable of functioning in various directions, associated with different capacities of mind and proceeding in the background of different patterns of mind, including those of intuitions, concepts and ideas. It contains thus only a set of 'procedures' (*Verfahren*), i.e., a set of 'method[s] for representing a multitude' (KrV, A140/B179), and contains by itself no patterns.⁵³ But it is also able to 'heighten' any patterns and rules so that it results in fantasy

⁵⁰ Cf. footnote 61 and the relevant text that the faculty of *taste* is a *discriminatory* faculty for evaluating objects.

⁵¹ Cf. Anth, 7: 240–41. The power of imagination is either 'productive' and 'precedes' all perceptual 'experience' and data of mind or 'reproductive' that 'brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously' (Anthr, 7: 167; cf. KrV, B152).

⁵² Cf. HN, 17: 73.

⁵³ Other procedures of mind Kant takes into consideration include the justification of knowledge and reasoning and include 'analyses' of the concepts and 'deduction' (KrV, BXIX–XXIII), different kinds, i.e. apagogic and ostensive 'proof' for knowledge (KrV, A791–794/B819–822, A727/B755, A734/B762), logical 'division' of concepts and 'principle for interference' (KrV, B112–116), 'criticism' as 'the maxim of a general mistrust of all' proposition in metaphysics for discerning 'a universal ground of their possibility' in 'the essential conditions of our cognitive faculty' (ÜE, 8: 226), 'speculative', 'naturalistic' and 'scientific' method (KrV, A5/B9, A780/B808f.) of inquiring the pure reason 'in accordance with principles' (KrV, A855/B883f.) and 'censorship of reason' as 'subjecting the *facta* of reason to examination and when necessary to blame' (KrV, A760/B788).

(Anth, 7: 173). To be a meaningful procedure, it should operate, however, on, within or according to some pattern.

Both in the *first edition* of the *first Critique* and in the *third Critique*, the apprehension of the power of imagination appears as a procedure independent of the activity and concepts of understanding for representing objects, and its action is ‘exercised immediately upon perceptions’ (KrV, A99, A120). In the *first Critique*, the power of imagination proceeds *within* the way and manner of perceiving intuitions, i.e., restricted to and controlled by ‘the modification of our sensibility’ that is ‘the only way in which objects are given to us’ (KrV, A139-140/B178-179), to construct and bring about the pattern for pure intuitions or reconstruct the pattern of empirical intuitions given by nature. Even by appending the power of imagination to the faculty of understanding in the *second edition*,⁵⁴ its procedure is dedicated to schematization according to the pattern ‘of’ concepts of understanding, the significance of which is in any case restricted to sensibility. By contrast, for the lack of any ‘sensible substratum’, i.e., any sensible intuitions and any ‘intelligible substratum’, i.e., any concepts as a cause, namely as ‘a determinate end’ for objects in the *third Critique* (EEKU, 20: 246; KU, 5: 228), the procedure of the power of imagination in its free play proceeds to the extent ‘the mind *becomes conscious* in the feeling of its state’ in-process (KU, 5: 204). That is to say, apprehending the phenomenal form of empirical intuitions, i.e. the extensive magnitude of shapes and surfaces of appearances in the *first Critique* proceeds by producing the parts of the whole of a representation in the background of a primitive pattern given by nature (KrV, A162/B201f.) – or by

⁵⁴ Even though the ‘figurative synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*)’ in the second edition seems to parallel the ‘apprehension’ in the first edition, it is ‘an effect of the understanding on sensibility’ because its activity pertains to ‘the original synthetic unity of apperception’ due to its ‘exercise of spontaneity’ (KrV, B151-2). As in the case of pure geometrical figures, the exercise of understanding here does not necessarily entail, however, the application of its concepts. Cf. footnote 40 and the relevant text.

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apprehending the ‘expansion’ of its sensations that ‘fills a space’ (KrV, A174/B216f.). Apprehending the phenomenal form of, eventually the same, empirical intuitions in the *third Critique* proceeds, by contrast, devoid of a primitive pattern, i.e., a corresponding sensible intuition, *within* which the power of imagination could proceed, and to this extent does ‘step beyond nature’ (KU, 5: 314), although its product can find its pattern ‘in a possible world’ (Anth, 7: 181).⁵⁵ The very apprehension in the *third Critique* has yet also the task of perceiving the proportion, arrangement and appropriateness of the disposition of cognitive faculties towards each other,⁵⁶ and subsuming the faculty of imagination under the understanding, by the reflective power judgment, without mapping with its concepts.⁵⁷

To this point, Carroll, for instance, argues that the apprehension of the power of imagination proceeds ‘in accordance with various patterns with no necessary end in view’ (2014: 64). Also, Allison argues that the imagination ‘strives to conceive new patterns of order’ in the form of an object (2001: 171). However, none of the suggestions determines what these patterns are, where they are derived from, or where the process of schematization of the power of imagination ends. As Kant himself points out, the procedure of forming and maintaining the representation of the

⁵⁵ Kant also notes that the ‘presentation’ of the ideal of the beauty in artistic creation (§59; KU, 5: 232) proceeds ‘in a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization’ without any corresponding sensible intuition (KU, 5: 351). However, and for the sake of its ‘richness’ and ‘originality’, the representational object to be produced in ideas by the genius ‘is not as necessary for the sake of beauty as is the suitability of the imagination in its freedom to the lawfulness of the understanding’ (KU, 5: 319).

⁵⁶ Kant calls it, therefore, the ‘common apprehension’ (KU, 5: 292).

⁵⁷ Cf. EEKU, 20: 231, note; KU, 5: 235, note, 323, 329, for arrangement and proportion of cognitive faculties; and KU, 5: 287, for subsuming the power of imagination under the faculty of understanding. I cannot thus agree with Zinkin that ‘the pure form of intensive intuition’ makes the feeling of pleasure possible (2006: 151), because reflective intuitions lack any sensations. The ‘intensity’ here should instead relate to the status of the power of imagination itself (cf. V-Anth/Fried, 25: 514f.).

beautiful ends where the human subject contents with himself because representational objects could have some patterns that would content the evaluating subject with himself. Call it the presumptive natural pattern. It is a kind of pattern that could be expected to be felt with pleasure from the first-person perspective as well as by others.⁵⁸

The first point is that the procedure of the power of imagination operates on no initial pattern (given by nature or the mind itself) to be reconstructed (or constructed) and according to no cognitive pattern for perceiving objects. We are only capable of revamping our cognitive faculties in order to form a pattern from disparate properties so that the resulted phenomenon affects the state of mind to be felt with pleasure. As a result, the apparently mutual and common empirical intuitions containing images, surfaces and shapes discussed in the *first* and *third Critique* follow distinct and different phenomenological patterns. While in the *first Critique* these products can be represented as mental content as to their spatial characteristics and manner, in the *third Critique* they signify only a phenomenal content of a *peculiar* kind without bearing any mental form. The product of judgments of taste cannot, therefore, be world-directed, but directs exclusively at self-satisfaction and charm. This line of thought can be followed and confirmed both in the *first* and *third Critique*. In §49 of the *third Critique*, where Kant speaks of artistic creation and worth to put into comparison with perceiving the beautiful in nature, he admits that the combination of the ‘stuff’ of mind grasped from a multitude of sensations and supplementary representations amounts to non-world-directed ‘inner intuitions’ goes ‘beyond the bounds of experience’ because the power of imagination is thereby not constrained by sensibility and understanding. They serve, therefore, to ‘entertain ourselves’ instead of explaining the appearances of the world

⁵⁸ As Kant argues, we are allowed to ‘expect’ and ‘presume (*zumuten*)’ the ‘confluence’ of the same feeling of pleasure of everyone (KU, 5: 240), because we are allowed to ‘ascribe (*ansinnen*)’ them similar cognitive faculties (KU, 5: 290).

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(KU, 5: 314-17). In addition, in *The ideal of pure reason* of the *first Critique*, on the ‘ideals of sensibility, he emphasizes that ‘the creatures of the imagination’ are not constrained by the attainable patterns of empirical intuitions and, thus, not explainable by the laws of sensibility. Such ‘individual traits’, namely ‘monograms’ are yet constituting ‘more a wavering sketch’ than a ‘determining image’ (KrV, A570/B598).⁵⁹ Notably, not being constrained by the concepts of understanding cannot count as an argument for the standpoint that some inner intuitions are thus non-conceptual. Inner intuitions in terms of stuff of mind could count as non-conceptual if they are positively justified by the way and manner of perceiving them to be world-directed. Consequently, Kant’s argument that ‘taste’ is a kind of ‘common sense (*sensus communis*)’ (KU, 5: 293-4, §40), is, as I see it, a cumulative argument, to give more weight to the non-sensible, i.e., the reflective status of the representation of the beautiful, and does not justify the emergence of the latter representation by itself. Since the empirical intuitions stand as the mutual representational objects for both sensible and reflective intuitions, it is also an argument against the non-conceptualists who restrict the class of sensible intuitions to empirical ones and take them as the relevant candidate for non-conceptual content. If the ‘data’ contained in appearances could justify the non-conceptuality of sensible intuitions, then reflective intuitions would also be another type of sensible intuitions.

Another point is that reflective intuitions can be felt with pleasure exclusively in judgments in terms of ‘formative evaluations’, whereas sensible intuitions can be propositional and non-propositional. Kant

⁵⁹ Thanks to an unanimous referee who reminds me of these two passages. However, the expressions of the aesthetic ideas by the genius is of less significance than perceiving the beautiful in nature for Kant’s aesthetics, namely ‘is not as necessary for the sake of beauty as is the suitability of the imagination in its freedom to the lawfulness of the understanding’ (KU, 5: 319).

discriminates judgments of taste from ‘cumulative evaluations’ in logic and the first *Critique* itself, in ethics and in teleology where there exists a determinate or initial judgment or a representational object to which we formally assign an additional value to make them perfect, rich and useful.⁶⁰ By contrast, judgments of taste are ‘subjectively, both object as well as law’ (KU, 5: 288), because there exists no initial object prior to the contention of the human subject.⁶¹ Kant calls this process of the mind of becoming conscious of some representational object as beautiful the *Empfänglichkeit* of the subject (EEKU, 20: 22), i.e., responsiveness of the evaluating subject to a representational object or its susceptibility of a representational object, as I suggest in English, not perceiving an object in the passive sense (*Rezeptivität*).⁶²

Kant does not develop the formalist aspect of judgments of taste in detail, but it is obvious that beside the conditionality defined between the animation and harmony of cognitive faculties, as the ‘ground’ (KU, 5: 217, 220f.), and the feeling of pleasure, as an ‘effect’ (KU, 5: 219), embedded in the logical ‘relation’ of judgments of taste (KU, §§10-17, ‘Third Moment’), he is implicitly convinced that the ‘quality’ of judgments of taste concerning the nature of the initial representational object itself (KU, §§1-5, ‘First Moment’), is biconditional to the effect that the feeling of pleasure is a result of judgments of taste if and only if the relation between the cognitive faculties accompanies the representation of an object observed among multiple variations of a representational object, if any. The product of judgments of taste is thus relational by nature. In other words, not all variations or combinations of an initial

⁶⁰ Cf. Log, 9: 16; V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 26; KrV, BIX, A12/B26; KpV, 5: 58; KU, 5: 379.

⁶¹ Therefore, Kant calls the faculty of taste an ‘unusual’ (KU, 5: 281, §31), and ‘entirely special faculty for discriminating and evaluating (*Beurteilung*)’ (KU, 5: 203; emphasis added), that rests on its own special transcendental principle.

⁶² The Cambridge Edition reads ‘receptivity’ instead of ‘responsiveness to’ or ‘susceptibility of’.

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representational object apprehended by the power of imagination can be felt with pleasure.

Kant's theory of taste, irrespective of considering the notion of 'observation' as a kind of phenomenal consciousness, is, therefore, highly confusing. If reflective intuitions were non-conceptual content, then the power of imagination had to provide a 'way and manner' for perceiving them. But it cannot. As I see it, reflective intuitions are no candidate for non-conceptual content because neither do they contain some (primitive) pattern given by nature or the mind itself nor do they exhibit the way and manner in which the world behaves. They only exhibit how cognitive faculties behave towards each other and towards observations. If the power of imagination could stand as the relevant cognitive apparatus for creating and justifying some content as non-conceptual, then reflective intuitions were *the* very candidate for non-conceptual content, a thesis that in turn implies that sensible intuitions were not.

4. Sensible Intuitions and Explanatory Clashes

Kant's different, i.e., synthetic and analytic narrative patterns in *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Prolegomena* suggest different scenarios about the role, significance and status of sensible intuitions, which have resulted in multiple explanatory clashes regarding the objectivity and unity of sensible intuitions. The narrative pattern in the *stepladder* passage of the *first Critique* suggests that sensible intuition is a 'conscious' representation, an 'objective perception' and thus a 'kind' of 'cognition' (KrV, B376f.), but should 'stand under categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness' (KrV, B143, §20). By contrast, the narrative pattern in the *Prolegomena* suggests that 'the discussion here is not about the *genesis* of experience', i.e., about the formation of the object in question, but about justification of 'that which lies in experience' (Prol, 4: 304, §21, emphasis added).

The different narrative patterns have been developed within the framework of four merged and requisite explanatory clashes, namely whether sensible intuitions: (i) are themselves a kind of cognition; (ii) should be considered as to their status quo or as to their generation; (iii) should be considered as violations against conceptual or as positive contributions of mind; and (iv) are propositional or non-propositional. I am not going to review all the solutions contributed in the secondary literature in detail but only to address them with regard to the trilogy of pattern, manner and procedure, as I have distinguished them in the previous sections, very briefly. As an initial diagnosis, the non-conceptual features and criteria assigned to sensible intuitions in contemporary Kant scholarship are borrowed to some great extent from Fregean and Russellian conceptions. Yet, unlike Frege's doctrine of sense (*Sinn*), sensible intuitions are not so constituted that they may have 'a sense' but 'no reference' (*Bedeutung*) (Frege, 1984: 159), and unlike Russellian doctrine of acquaintance, sensible intuitions do not refer to objects of the outer world if they are specified by their constituent 'sense-data' (Russell, 1911: 111, 115).

Kant believes that sensible intuitions are indeed a self-contained kind of cognition and differ from other conscious states of mind and perceptions contained in the inner sense. Except Hanna (2011, 2020), almost any non-conceptualist reading considers that the representational content of sensible intuitions is a positive and conscious state of mind that provides us with direct and non-propositional awareness of objects. Without considering the status of sensible intuitions as to their generation in judgments of cognition, they try, however, to highlight the notionally separable status of sensible intuitions and argue thus in favor of the immediacy of intuitions in terms of their actuality, including the fineness of grain of sensible intuitions and the analogy between human and non-human animals as having a mutual

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sensory layer cake in cognitions.⁶³ As I argued, the fineness of grain concerns the ‘data’ of appearances and is restricted to the specific pattern of empirical intuitions given by nature, not their mental form. Nor do I agree with the second argument because ‘we can speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint’ (KrV, A26/B42).

Moderate conceptualist readings seem to be more consistent at this point. Among others, Longuenesse argues that sensible intuitions should be submitted to a ‘rereading’ according to ‘figurative synthesis’ (KrV, B151-2) in judgments of experience and are, therefore, proto-propositional (Longuenesse 1998: 214f.). It utters as well the problem of whether the necessity of applying categories to sensible intuitions implies as well the ‘justification’ of doing so (Stephenson 2014) and ‘instantiation’ of these concepts in experience (Gomes 2010). If not, then there is a gap.⁶⁴ By contrast, absolute conceptualists argue that judgments of cognition ‘imply’ the application of categories from the very beginning and sensible intuitions are thus nothing other than sensory inputs.⁶⁵ As I see it, Hanna’s absolute non-conceptualism is compatible with the latter conception and creates, as he himself develops, another kind of gap, i.e., that there are certain essentially non-conceptual perceptual experiences that violate the application of categories.⁶⁶ Hanna’s gap does not affect my reading because rogue objects are not of significance as world-directed representations.

Nor does absolute conceptualist readings affect my reading because ‘the conditions of its unity’ that the understanding assigns to appearances cannot degenerate the isomorphy of sensible intuitions,

⁶³ Arguments for non-conceptual content can be found in Speaks (2005), Schmidt (2015) and Hanna (2011: 330-31).

⁶⁴ For an extensive discussion of these gaps, cf. Schulting (2017: 141ff.).

⁶⁵ Cf. McDowell (1994) and Ginsborg (2013), among others.

⁶⁶ Cf. Hanna (2013: 15-16).

and because the ‘conditions’ of the unity of understanding are not equal to the application of its ‘concepts’. As to the first feature, pure concepts of understanding apply to ‘objects of intuition *in general* (*überhaupt*)’ (KrV, B150, §24; emphasis added), where ‘in general’ could include, for one thing, both sensible and non-sensible intuitions opaquely,⁶⁷ and cannot substantiate, for another thing, the extendedness of objects. And as to the second feature, the understanding can be operative in determining objects (as in the case of the geometrical figures), ‘insofar as it contains the basis for the unity of the construction of these figures’ meta-cognitively without applying its concepts (Prol, 4:321-2).⁶⁸ The same line of argument can also be found in Kant’s theory of taste, where the harmony of the cognitive faculties affects the state of mind ‘in general’ (*überhaupt*),⁶⁹ without thereby mapping the contribution of the productive power of imagination with the concepts of understanding. The kind of ‘unity’ that the understanding assigns to representational objects is, therefore, not necessarily identical with that of its concepts.

5. Conclusion

I think that Kantian non-conceptualists can have their own cake and eat it, and in fact, eat it alone. I clarified that it is ‘the way and manner’ of perceiving objects through the representation of *space* as a *cognitive pattern* that justifies the emergence of sensible intuitions with phenomenologically different *patterns*, given by nature or the mind itself. I also clarified that the *procedure* of joining the manifold contained in the representation of an object together through the apprehension of the power of imagination operates in the *background* of an already available world-directed pattern. If not, it operates on disparate properties to

⁶⁷ Cf. KrV, 148-9.

⁶⁸ Cf. also footnote 40.

⁶⁹ Cf. KU, 5: 238-9, 5: 241, note.

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form and maintain a non-world-directed, i.e., a presumptive pattern. As a result, representations can be referring if they are spatial.

I clarified that sensible intuitions and reflective intuitions assign two distinct kinds of phenomenal consciousness. Even though both kinds of intuitions are positive contributions of the mind, sensible intuitions are well-founded information and the positive truth of cognition as to their cognitive pattern, whereas reflective intuitions are discriminatory and peculiar by nature. Sensible intuitions can be considered both as to their status quo and as to their generation, while reflective intuitions exclusively as to their generation. Sensible intuitions can be propositional, proto-propositional and non-propositional, while reflective intuitions can be exclusively propositional.

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